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COLLECTIVE ACTION OR POWER POLICY?

It may seem anachronistic to suggest that law might have something
to do with the high politics of international security. The period between
the two world wars has, of course, been credited precisely by a mistaken
reliance on such an idea. Confidence in the League of Nations' ability to
deter aggression did not only, we are told by Realists of the post-war
order, prove an academic error, it was positively harmful in directing
attention away from the need to prepare for the inevitable aggression
when it came.
This is the understanding that most of us, as diplomats, political
theorists, or lawyers, have cultivated through most of the past five decades. We have labelled belief in the ability of rules and institutions to
deter aggression "formalism," or even worse, "legalism," highlighting its
abstract, utopian character, its distance from the flesh and blood of the
application of power by states to fulfill their interests. Only ten years
ago, Stanley Hoffmann commented on the state of world order studies:
Nobody seems to believe anymore in the chances of collective
security; because of its constraining character, it is too contrary to
the freedom of judgement and action implied by sovereignty; and
... it is in conflict with the imperatives of prudence in the nuclear
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age, in which the localization or insulation of conflicts appears far
preferable to their generalization.'
In this article I want to examine the place of law in our thinking about
and sometimes participation in decisionmaking regarding international
security. After the end of the Cold War, and particularly since the
United Nations' reaction to Iraq's occupation of Kuwait in 1990-91, an
academic debate concerning the possibility of collective security has
arisen anew. 2 My intention is not to take a definite view in that controversy. Instead, I shall suggest that this debate has been framed so as to
obscure the role of normative considerations, including law, in the
production or construction of collective security. A theoretical-instrumental bias produces competing descriptions of the conditions of international "security," but it fails to provide an understanding of the actual
contexts of decisionmaking on "security." For an internal, or cultural
examination of collective security, a distinctly legal approach seems not
only useful, but unavoidable.
I.

REBIRTH OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY?

The collective security system of the Charter is based on two elements. First, there is the prohibition against inter-state threat or use of
force under Article 2(4). The second element is the Council's "primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security ....[expressed in both the members' agreement] that in carrying out
its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf' 3 and in those Charter provisions which establish a legal obligation
on member states to carry out the Council's decisions.4
Collective security, often academically distinguished from balance of
power politics, is seen as invoking an "automatic" reaction against any

1.STANLEY

HOFFMANN,

Is There an International Order?, in

JANUS

ESSAYS IN THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 85,
essay was originally published in French in 1985.

AND MINERVA:

117 (1987). The

2. See, e.g., Richard K. Betts, Systems for Peace or Causes of War? Collective Security,
Arms Control, and the New Europe, INT'L SECURITY, Summer 1992, at 5; Helmut
FreudenschuB, Between Unilateralismand Collective Security: Authorizations to Use Force by
the Security Council, 5 EUR. J. INT'L L. 492 (1994); Andrew Hurreil, Collective Security and

InternationalOrder Revisited, 11 INT'L REL. 37 (1992).
3. U.N. CHARTER art. 24, 1 1.
4. Id. arts. 25, 48. Also relevant in this context is Article 2(5), which requires member
states to "give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with
the present Charter," and requires that no assistance be given to any state against which
preventive or enforcement action is being taken pursuant to the terms of the Charter. Id. art.
2, 5.
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potential aggressor.5 Collective security under the U.N. Charter system,
however, involves little automation. Under the Charter, the decision of
whether and how to react is vested with .the Council, which itself has
broad discretion. Whether this makes the Charter system something
other than collective security under some definition is uninteresting. No
system of rule-application is "automatic" as envisioned by the academic
distinction between collective security and balance of power. The point
is that under the Charter, member states have renounced some of their
freedom of action by vesting the Council with competence to decide on
collective action on their behalf and are (legally) bound by the decisions
the Council has made. The United Nations system has a strong bias
against unilateralism and broad directives to guide the Council as it
exercises its competence.
That the Cold War made it impossible to apply the security system
embedded in Chapter VII of the Charter is, of course, well-known.6 The
procedure for collective reaction in Articles 39 through 42 was set aside
in favor of the balance of power strategies employed by the great powers outside the United Nations. The little enforcement activity that remained with the Security Council was limited to decolonization issues
that did not bear upon great power relations. Appeals by the General
Assembly to activate collective security under the Charter system came
to nought.7
Judged against the Council's historical record, its reaction to Iraq's
invasion of Kuwait from August 1990 onwards was clearly something
new, even though paradoxically described as a "return" to the original
concept of Chapter VII of the Charter. In his 1992 Agenda for Peace,
the Secretary-General made several references to "collective security."
He explained:
an opportunity has been regained to achieve the great objectives of
the Charter - a United Nations capable of maintaining international peace and security, of securing justice and human rights and of
promoting, in the words of the Charter, "social progress and better
standards of life in larger freedom." This opportunity must not be

5. See, e.g., Betts, supra note 2, at 16; John J. Mearsheimer, The False Promise of
SECURITY, Winter 1994/95, at 5, 29-32.
WHITE, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE MAINTENANCE
e.g.,
N.D.
6. For analyses,. see,
OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY (1990).
7. See G.A. Res. 159, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., 117th plen. mtg., Agenda Item 73, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/40/159 (1986); G.A. Res. 119, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., 108th plen. mtg.,
Agenda Item 137, U.N. Doc. A/RES/37/119 (1983).

International Institutions, INT'L
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squandered. The Organization must never again be crippled as it
was in the era that has now passed.'
During the first forty years of the United Nations (1946-86), the Council made only two determinations of "breach of the peace" under Article
39.9 In that same time span, only two states (Israel and South Africa)
had their acts labelled "aggression" while the Council recognized the
existence of a "threat to international peace and security" seven times.'
During the first forty-five years of the United Nations' history, the
Council had resorted to military force three times," and to binding nonmilitary sanctions twice. 2 In light of the perhaps seventy-three interstate wars that broke out during this same period, 3 the data clearly
shows the dramatic extent of the Council's paralysis.
Since 1990, the situation looks altogether different. Collective measures have been taken in eight situations - Iraq, Liberia, former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Libya, Angola, Haiti, and Rwanda. The Council has
authorized the use of military force five times through a total of nineteen resolutions.' 4 In each of the eight situations, the Council had recourse to binding, non-military sanctions. For comparison, consider the
following statistics: in 1988, there were five peacekeeping operations, by
1994, the number was seventeen; in 1988, the Council adopted fifteen

8. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking
and Peace-Keeping: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Agenda Item

3, U.N. Doe. A/47/277 (1992).
9. S.C. Res. 502, U.N. SCOR, 37th Sess., 2350th mtg., U.N. Doe. S/RES/502
(Falklands); S.C. Res. 82, U.N. SCOR, 5th Sess., 473d mtg., U.N. Doe. S/1501
(Korea).
10. S.C. Res. 573, U.N. SCOR, 40th Sess., 2615th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/573
(Israel's attack on PLO headquarters in Tunis); S.C. Res. 418, U.N. SCOR, 32d Sess.,
10,

(1982)
(1950)
(1985)
2046th

mtg., U.N. Doe. S/RES/418 (1977) (South Africa); S.C. Res. 353, U.N. SCOR, 29th Sess.,
1781st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/353 (1974) (Cyprus); S.C. Res. 307, U.N. SCOR, 26th Sess.,
1621st mtg., U.N. Doe. S/RES/307 (1971) (Pakistan); S.C. Res. 232, U.N. SCOR, 21st Sess.,
1340th mtg., U.N. Doe. S/RES/232 (1966) (South Rhodesia); S.C. Res. 161, U.N. SCOR,
16th Sess., 942d mtg., U.N. Doe. S/4741 (1961) (Congo); S.C. Res. 54, U.N. SCOR, 3d Sess.,

338th mtg., U.N. Doe. S/902 (1948) (Palestine).
11. Korea, The Congo, South Rhodesia. The last was an authorization for Britain to
patrol Beira harbour in Mozambique to prevent oil from reaching Rhodesia. S.C. Res. 221,
U.N. SCOR, 21st Sess., 1277th mtg., U.N. Doe. S/RES/221 (1966).
12. The economic blockade of Southern Rhodesia (1966-79) and the arms embargo of
South Africa (1977-94).
13. WHITE, supra note 6, at 47.

14. S.C. Res. 940, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3413th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/940 (1994)
(Haiti); S.C. Res. 929, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3392d mtg., U.N. Doe. S/RES/929 (1994)
(Rwanda); S.C. Res. 836, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3228th mtg., U.N. Doe. S/RES/836 (1993)
(former Yugoslavia); S.C. Res. 814, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3188th mtg., U.N. Doe.
S/RES/814 (1993) (Somalia); S.C. Res. 794, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3145th mtg., U.N. Doe.

S/RES/794 (1992); S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963d mtg., U.N. Doe. S/RES/678
(1990) (Iraq). For a full analysis of the resolutions, see FreudenschuB, supra note 2, at
493-522.
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resolutions, in 1994, the Council adopted seventy-eight. From 1988 to
1994, the number of annual informal consultations among Council
members rose from forty to 240.5
A qualitative development has likewise taken place in the Council's
understanding of its task of "maintaining international peace and security." Traditionally, collective security - and with it, the Council's competence - was seen as a military matter, concerned with the prevention
of inter-state violence and, in particular, the transboundary use of force.
However, most modern large-scale violence does not involve formal
armies marching across boundaries. As Agenda for Peace never tires to
remind us, and countless reviews of post-Cold War peacekeeping keep
repeating, the greatest proportion of large-scale violence that presents a
threat to international peace and security is home-brewn violence - civil
war. Whatever conceptual difficulties tackling with non-international6
conflicts might pose for traditional applications of collective security,'
the limitation of violence within one state has not prevented the Security
Council from using its mandate to intervene during recent years.
Of the five peace-keeping operations that existed in early 1988, four
related to inter-state wars and only one (20 per cent of the total) to
an intra-state conflict. Of the 21 operations established since then,
only 8 have related to inter-state wars, whereas 13 (62 per cent)
have related to intra-state conflicts .... Of the 11 operations
established since
January 1992 all but 2 (82 per cent) relate to intra7
state conflicts.
Moreover, it has long been argued that war can effectively be prevented
only by tackling its root causes, that war is merely the external manifestation of the violence of the social institutions, that peace follows only
from domestic enlightenment and justice. 18 Modern liberals have continued to make the same case. Peace starts at home with the eradication of
poverty, social injustice, and the violation of human rights. 9 Today,
"non-military threats to security" and the "comprehensive concept of

15. See Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, U.N. GAOR,
49th Sess., at 5, U.N. Doc. A/49/1 (1994); Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: PositionPaper of the Secretary-Generalon the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United
Nations, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., I 11, U.N. Doc. A/50/60 (1995).
16. Cf. Hurrell, supra note 2, at 38-39.

17. Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position-Paperof the Secretary-General on the
Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, supra note 15, 11.
18. See IMMANUEL KANT, To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, in PERPETUAL
PEACE AND OTHER ESSAYS ON POLITICS, HISTORY, AND MORALS 107 (Ted Humphrey trans.,
Hackett Publishing Co. 1983) (1795), especially the "First Definitive Article of Perpetual
Peace: The Civil Constitution of Every Nation Should Be Republican[,]" id. at 112-15.
19. For a programmatic discussion, see Fernando R. Tes6n, The Kantian Theory of

InternationalLaw, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 53 (1992).
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security" are rooted in the vocabulary of diplomats and politicians
throughout the political spectrum. At one euphoric moment in 1992, the
Security Council, in its first meeting at the level of Heads of State and
Government, stressed that "[t]he non-military sources of instability in the
economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats
to peace and security."'2 It is not yet clear whether this much-quoted
sentence should be taken at face value; that is, as an indication of the
Council's readiness to use its collective security powers under Chapter
VII of the Charter to deal with economic, social, humanitarian, or ecological developments which, in its opinion, are sufficiently grave to
warrant such treatment. But the statement invokes the language of Article
39 of the Charter that triggers the Council's reactive competence and
does suggest an image of the Council as a post-Cold War Leviathan; not
only as police but as judge," or perhaps as priest,22 of a new world
order.
II. COLLECTIVE ACTION OR POWER POLICY?
However, there is controversy about the correct understanding of
these developments. While many agree with the Secretary-General that
the Council's newly found activism should be seen as a "return" to the
"original" Charter conception, others have been more doubtful. Several
factors complicate a reading of the Council's recent activity as an application of collective security.
The first problem relates to the Council's notorious selectiveness.2 3
Why Libya, but not Israel? Why the Council's passivity during most of
the eight-year Iran-Iraq war? Why has the Council's reaction in Africa
been markedly less 'vigorous and effective than in the Gulf?. Why the
discrepancy between the Council's forceful attack on Iraq (an Islamic
country) and its timidity to defend the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
The choice of targets, as well as the manner of reacting, has certainly not
been automatic. The argument is made that the Council has not reflected
the collective interests of United Nations members as a whole, but only

20. Note by the President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3046th mtg.

at 3, U.N. Doc. S/23500 (1992).
21. See Jean-Marc Sorel, Rapport gindral L'ilargissement de la notion de menace contre
la paix, in SOCI9T9 FRANIAISE POUR LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, COLLOQUE DE RENNES, LE
CHAPITRE VII DE LA CHARTE DES NATIONS UNIES 3, 52 (1995); Keith Harper, Note, Does the

United Nations Security Council Have the Competence to Act as Court and Legislature?, 27

N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 103 (1994).
22. Cf. Martti Koskenniemi, The Police in the Temple: Order, Justice and the UN: A
Dialectical View, 6 EUR. J. INT'L L. 325 (1995).
23. See OLIVIER RUSSBACH, ONU CONTRE ONU: LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL CONFISQU9

(1994).
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the special interests and factual predominance of the United States and its
Western allies within the Council.
This point seems particularly potent in relation to the form of the
Council's recourse to military force. The Kuwait crisis presented a
unique opportunity to activate the integrity of the Charter's collective
reaction machinery. This would have included not only a decision on
military action against Iraq, but also the conclusion of "special agree-'
ments" under Article 43 between the Council and member states for the
submission of national military contingents to the Council as well as the
activation of the military staff committee as envisioned in Article 47.
However, none of this was done. The Council merely gave its "authorization" for a coalition led by the United States to attack Iraq while absolving itself from the operational command and control of the coalition
action.2 4
Lawyers have been at pains to find a plausible legal basis for this
novel formulation: collective security or unilateral action in (collective)
self-defence - or excs de pouvoir?25 The debate has been largely
inconsequential. Since Operation Desert Storm, the same formulation has
been used in each of the four other situations (Somalia, former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Haiti) in which the Council has decided to use
military force. In each, the acting party has been a powerful member or
a coalition led by a powerful member (usually the United States, except
for "Operation Turquoise" in Rwanda, which was carried out by
France).2 6
It is equally difficult to interpret the "new generation peacekeeping"
as a collective security device. True, the appearance of blue helmets with
increasing frequency in the context of actual fighting, and sometimes
with a mandate to use limited force, has seemed a step toward collective
enforcement of pre-established standards of behavior. However, a closer
study of the relevant cases (particularly those of UNPROFOR in Krajina
and Bosnia and UNOSOM II in Somalia) shows that the use of force is

24. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963d mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (1990).
25. There is a great deal of literature on the subject. See, e.g., Robert Lavalle, The Law
of the United Nations and the Use of Force, Under the Security Council Resolutions of 1990
and 1991, to Resolve the Persian Gulf Crisis, 23 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 3, 33-46 (1992); Oscar
Schachter, United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 452 (1991); Colin
Warbrick, The Invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, 40 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 482, 486-87 (1991);
Michel-Cyr Djiena Wembou, Riflexions sur la validiti et la porte de la risolution 678 du
Conseil de Sicuritif, 5 AvR. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 34, 44-49 (1993); Ralph Zacklin, Les nations
unies et la crise du Golfe, in LES ASPECTS JURIDIQUES DE LA CRISE ET DE LA GUERRE DU
GOLFE 57, 69 (Brigitte Stem ed., 1991).
26. S.C. Res. 940, supra note 14 (U.S.-led military intervention in Haiti "to facilitate the
departure from Haiti of the military leadership"); S.C. Res. 929, supra note 14 (French action
to "achieve... humanitarian objectives" in Rwanda); S.C. Res. 836, supra note 14 (NATO air
strikes to support peacekeepers); S.C. Res. 794, supra note 14 (Operation "Restore Hope" in
Somalia).
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not directed at keeping aggression at bay, but at carrying out humanitarian assignments during armed conflict for puposes similar to those of the
Red Cross.27 A careful examination of the nineteen resolutions in which
the Council has either authorized member states to take military action or
otherwise expanded the mandate of peacekeeping forces has prompted
one observer to conclude that "a new instrument has been created out of
the need to fill the gap between the invocation of an inapplicable or
and the unwanted application
inopportune right to collective self-defence
28
of the system of collective security.
In addition, the application of economic sanctions by the Council in
the eight Chapter VII situations has not been automatic in a way that
would have clearly distinguished it from an interest-governed exercise of
economic power. True, most states implemented the Iraqi sanctions
diligently, transforming the Council's decisions into acts of national
law.29 Yet the Council's failure to manage its economic statecraft in a
rational way has made it doubtful whether member states should continue
to take its use of sanctions seriously. There has been no antecedent planning of the measures nor an evaluation of their effects on the target
states' economy or political decisionmaking. The objectives of sanctions
have sometimes been very unclear. The sanctions have been managed by
five separate committees consisting of diplomats of the member states of
the Council who have neither the interest, time, or resources to do the
job properly. These five committees work in secret, not even reporting to
the Council. They follow partly differing procedures resulting in differing
interpretative decisions on, for example, the application of the humanitarian exemptions.30 The Council has failed to react to widely publicized
violations of sanctions by individual states, for example, the Islamic
states' non-application of the Libyan boycott in force since 1992. The
Council has also failed to take action to alleviate the problems of vulnerable third states.3'

27. Cf. S.C. Res. 836, supra note 14 (limited use of force to protect the "safe areas"); S.C.
Res. 814, supra note 14 (limited use of force mandate for UNOSOM II).
28. Freudenschul, supra note 2, at 522.
29. Cf. THE KUWAIT CRISIS: SANCTIONS AND THEIR ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES (D.L.

Bethlehem ed., 1991).

30. See Koskenniemi, supra note 22, at 345-46; infra note 92.
31. Some of these difficulties were taken up by the Secretary-General in early 1995. See
Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position-Paperof the Secretary-Generalon the Occasion
of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, supra note 15,
66-76. The Council
responded by indicating certain measures to "make the procedures of the Sanctions Committees
more transparent[.]" Note by the Presidentof the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. S/1995/234 (1995).
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III. THE REALIST CRITIQUE OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY
These various critiques suggest the foundation for two conclusions
usually associated with the doctrine of international Realism. First, they
imply that the Council's activity should not be understood in terms of a
functioning collective security system. It does not involve rule-application in the way that would differentiate it from "normal" hegemonic or
balance of power policy. All aggressors are not, in fact, being hit by the
system. Some states that are not aggressors are being hit by it because
that seems to be in the interests of the hegemonic powers. I call this
critique the interpretative thesis. Its point is that we cannot interpret or
understand the recent United Nations actions as applications of collective
security.
Second, the critiques also support the more general Realist position
according to which collective security is impossible - that it simply
cannot work (the case of the Cold War) or works only as a camouflage
for power policy. Whether peace exists is not dependent upon the presence or absence of rules about collective reaction, but upon the application of power by those states in a position to do so in the advancement
of their interests. I call this critique the causal thesis.32
The two theses rely on a clear differentiation between legal "rules"
and political "interests" and on the priority of the latter over the former.
Since the great powers' interests are protected by Articles 24 and 27 of
the Charter, the mechanism seems already defined so as to defer to them.
Nor are other interests irrelevant. It is not difficult to conceive of cases
in which the interests of a member state that has a special relationship
with the target state or which is vulnerable to retaliation seem so important as to override conventional obligations. 33 Jordan's continuous and
widely accepted breach of sanctions against Iraq is one example. A variation of this theme links it to the logic of state behavior. Whatever rationally calculable long-term advantage there might be for a state to abide
by a collective measures norm will not offset the more immediate harm
that it will seem to suffer as a result of obedience. So even if a purely
rational calculation of interests might speak in favor of obedience,
considerations relating to, for example, the unwillingness of political
elites to make "hard decisions" will overrule such calculations. This is a
variant of the argument from the "tragedy of the commons" - that even

32. For a forceful reformulation, see Mearsheimer, supra note 5, at 28-33.
33. The doubts about the reality of the American nuclear umbrella in case of an attack on
Western Europe, and its consequent readiness to set itself as a target for a similar attack,
illustrate this point. So does the hypothesis of a Russian attack on the Ukraine. It is not
plausible to believe that small European states will risk their safety by joining in a campaign
to support Ukraine's independence.
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if it were rational for all participants in a common good ("security" in
this case) to take action to safeguard it against danger, there are always
some who choose to become free riders - with the effect that it will
appear rational for others to choose a similar policy as well.' Collective
security, Realists have insisted, relies upon trust between the partners. In
the absence of trust (a fact that defines the condition of international
"anarchy"), it seems both rational and responsible to place immediate
self-interest before an uncertain and fragile common interest.35
Moreover, procedural difficulties may seem daunting. Within an
agreement to react to aggression some members will receive more
protection than others. Selectivity is unavoidable. Much may depend on
whether the aggressor is able to invoke the support of a permanent
member. Even if members of a security pact had parallel interests, a
collective reaction procedure could still not be applied consistently.
Political choices will have to be taken when interpreting, for example,
who the aggressor is, or whether there has been a "threat to the peace."
We are not entitled to assume that the historic, ethnic, or political, affiliations or hostilities between particular members of such a pact are irrelevant when making those choices. But even if there were no divergent
affiliations, we may hardly hold as irrelevant factors such as the likelihood that retaliatory action against one aggressor would expose pact
members to attack by another aggressor or drive the aggressors into each
others' arms, a fear that hampered the League's sanctions policy against
Italy in 1935-36. Who decides when to react and how? Who pays for
reaction or the costs of preparation? Who will command the collective
force or decide on the objectives of common action and when they have
been attained? 36 If everything depends on the particular facts and circumstances, the rule-governed character of the procedure will disappear and,
with it, the system's deterrent force. It will start to seem like just another
37
context for politics.

IV.

THE LIMITS OF REALISM: THEORY V. ENGAGEMENT

The above theses are powerful. They show that decisionmaking
within the Security Council cannot be described as rule-application in the

34. See Josef Joffe, Collective Security and the Future of Europe: Failed Dreams and
Dead Ends, SURVIVAL, Spring 1992, at 36, 42.
35. See the discussion in JUSTIN ROSENBERG, THE EMPIRE OF CIVIL SOCIETY: A CRITIQUE OF THE REALIST THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 27 (1994).

36. See Adam Roberts, The United Nations and International Security, SURVIVAL,
Summer 1993, at 3, 23-26.
37. These questions reflect the different position in which members to a collective security

pact are vis-d-vis each other. Some will have to lead, others will have to follow. It is not selfevident that parties will be ready to accept the assessment of the largest potential contributor
- but if they do not, will the contributor contribute?
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abstract fashion in which "collective security" has often been portrayed.
However, the theses are also limited. They operate with a very narrow
notion of "rule-application" and fail to see to what extent their determining concepts such as "interest," "power," or "security" are themselves
defined and operative within a normative context.
Realism receives its strength from its focus on empirical-instrumental
questions such as "what happened?" or "what can be made to happen?"
But it avoids posing normative questions such as "what should happen?"
or "what should have happened?" Or more accurately, Realism deals
with the latter set of questions on the basis of its responses to the former.
Having committed itself to a descriptive sociology of the international
world characterized by the struggle for "power" by "states" in the pursuit
of "national interests," Realism marginalizes normative questions into
issues of "ethics," oscillating between the private (and thus inscrutable)
morality of individual statesmen and the public morality of states in
which it seems necessary sometimes to dirty one's hands in order to
prevent the system's collapse into anarchy. Realism is avowedly instrumentalist, that is, concerned with the effects of particular policies on the
world. However, its instrumentalism is not that of the situated participant
but that of the external observer, the rational calculator, the theorybuilder. To the external observer, the statesmen and states are atomistic
subjects, equipped with a predetermined bag of interests or "values,"
standing outside the international polity on which they seek to employ
various diplomatic, economic, and military management techniques.
However, since the basic tenents of its sociology turn out to be normatively loaded, Realism seems compelled to defend itself on normative
terms: one's "security" will appear as another's domination, one's
"intervention" as another's "protection of sovereignty."38 In this debate,
there is no privileged realm of pure description.
A. The Normative in the Empirical
The interpretativethesis argued that legal or political principles "are
not sufficient to explain either the past history of collective security or
the course of events in the Gulf. ' 39 The determinant factors in recent
Council actions were not Charter provisions or international law, but the
new rapport between the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia, the
strategic and economic significance of Kuwait to the Western allies, and

38. For this latter theme, see Cynthia Weber's collapsing of the two apparent opposites
into a single term she refers to as "sovereignty-intervention," a term which can characterize
any conceivable inter-state relationship. CYNTHIA WEBER, SIMULATING SOVEREIGNTY: INTERVENTION, THE STATE AND SYMBOLIC EXCHANGE 123-27 (Cambridge Stud. Int'l Rel. No. 37,

1995).
39. Hurrell, supra note 2, at 49.
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so on. I have no great problem with this thesis. It opens a critical perspective that refuses to take at face value the suggestion that United
Nations action represents communal interests merely because it has been
decided by the Security Council. Nonetheless, the thesis' usefulness remains limited precisely because its hermeneutic suggestion excludes
reference to international norms.
During the past years, the foundational character of the hard facts of
state power and interest to our understanding of international politics has
been questioned from a wide variety of perspectives. The "level of analysis" approach already modified Realism's strong reliance on states as the
basic units by which international acts should be explained. 4° Structural
constraints and non-state actors seemed to create effects as well. Yet,
even structural Realism's analytical priority for states may seem like an
ideological move, justifying conservative policy and failing to account
for the determining agency of class, economic system, or religious faith
in the geopolitical, just as in the national, space.4 1 Perhaps less controversially, liberal Internationalists have long insisted that the "globalization
of politics" has formed interest groups and lines of battle that cannot be
reduced to the application of power by states.42 To "explain" the United
Nations action in Somalia, for instance, in terms of a power play between
members of the Security Council would undermine the extent to which
humanitarian perceptions, institutional programs and ambitions, the
legacy of East African colonialism, and the character of the Siad Barre
regime account for the relevant events. Aside from states, we see both
metropolitan (United Nations) and peripheral (Somali) actors, ideas, and
interests as relevant.43 To argue that things went so bad because there
was no clear national interest to protect is a non sequitur: things went as
they did because the events showed factors other than a "national interest" as relevant.
The concept of "power" is likewise famously contested. Realists'
over-identification of power with military power was undermined by the
end of the Cold War. Inasmuch as "power" is seen in larger terms of

40. For the classic neo-Realist work which introduced the "level of analysis" concept, see
N. WALTZ, MAN, THE STATE AND WAR (1959). The level of analysis approach,
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however, is only a temporary resolution of the problem of adjusting theory to observable facts.

A more fundamental problem relates to the constructive aspects of observation itself: whether
we tend to see individual states, economic systems, ideologies, individuals, or transnational
communities as the relevant actors seems dependent on our prior choice of the relevant "level"
(matrix). The choice of the level, however, must be independent from the thing to be explained, i.e., on a pre-empirical evaluation of significance.
41. See generally ROSENBERG, supra note 35.
42. The ideas of "common security" and "comprehensive security" seeks to capture this
image. For one recent reformulation, see COMMISSION ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, OUR GLOBAL
NEIGHBORHOOD 78-84 (1995).
43. The argument draws inspiration from MICHAEL W. DOYLE, EMPIRES 22-30 (1986).
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structure and knowledge, its embedment in other explicanda becomes
evident. 44 Power is a matter of perspective. It receives meaning as threat
or support depending on how we relate to it. It is applied as a means to
an end different from itself. A study of ends, however, introduces normative elements into the explanatory matrix that cannot be grasped by
the sort of empiricism that Realists espouse. 45 The establishment of
economic sanctions on Libya by the Security Council in 1992 as a result
of Qaddafi's unwillingness to extradite the suspects for the 1988
Lockerbie terrorist attack can clearly be seen as an application of power
by the Western allies. But this is more the starting point than the end of
the analysis. It would be difficult to understand the action without further
reference to the role "terrorism" plays in Western political discourse,
enabling the taking of extraordinary means - in this case the nonapplication of a valid treaty (the 1971 Montreal Convention against aerial
terrorism) and the overrunning of the International Court of Justice. It is
the normative construct of a specific "terrorism discourse" that makes
possible the organization and application of physical power against
Libya.'
Nor is "national interest" any more transparent. Whose interest is
that? States, just like individuals, live in a network of partly overlapping,
partly incompatible interests. Choosing an interest to base a policy is, as
feminists have always argued, a normative act, and not something one
automatically discovers after one has decided to further national interests.
In any case, the assumption of a unitary national interest fails to account
for, and even less articulate, the contrasting interest of a local population,
minority, or women, for instance.47 To say that Yemen supported Iraq in
the Council during 1989-90 because that was in its interests is not only
questionable insofar as Yemen's economic or diplomatic position was
concerned (and undermines the effect of the ideological and religious
links involved), but lifts the policy of the Yemeni male elite to a representational position inimical to other Yemeni interests. 48 In fact, a refer44. Alexander Wendt, ConstructingInternationalPolitics, INT'L SECURITY, Summer 1995,

at 71, 73-75.
45. For the expanding literature challenging the empiricist/positivist bias of international
relations studies and stressing the need to undertake normatively focused analyses, see generally
CHRIS BROWN, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY: NEW NORMATIVE APPROACHES (1992);
MERVYN FROST, TOWARDS A NORMATIVE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1986); MARK
A. NEUFELD, THE RESTRUCTURING OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY (1995).

46. See Ileana Porras, On Terrorism: Reflections on Violence and the Outlaw, 1994 UTAH
L. REV. 119.
47. Anne Orford, The Politics of Collective Security, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 373 (1996); see
generally AMERICAN SOC'Y INT'L L., STUDIES IN TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL POLICY No. z5,
RECONCEIVING REALITY: WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Dorinda G. Dallmayer ed.,
1993) [hereinafter RECONCEIVING REALITY].
48. The point is strikingly illustrated by the fact that in the first post-Gulf War elections
in Kuwait in October 1992, only 14% of the country's 600,000 citizens were eligible to vote.
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ence to "interests" is often no more than a sweeping gesture toward the
truism, present since Vattel, that states act in accordance with their selfinterest. However, the important point is that even "[s]elf-interest cannot
be an unproblematic concept if the self is conceived4 9 as a set of constructed identities that need not be stable over time.
Arguing that normative factors are either irrelevant or only marginally relevant to Security Council action undermines the degree to which
any social action, including international activity,, makes constant reference to normative codes, rules, or principles. Political events are never
simply physical acts or people behaving empirically in this way or that.50
They exist in relation to a shared normative code of meaning. Sending
troops into another country is not a full description of an event: normative terms such as "aggression," "self-defence," "counter-measure,"
"territorial sovereignty," or "peacekeeping" are not solely disinterested
descriptions of the events. They refer back to more general, systemic
theories, assumptions, world-views, and prejudices that provide the
implicit matrix that makes description possible. An account of the Gulf
War that makes no reference to such notions but is content to refer to
United States military or economic interests would be no understanding
at all. It would fail to grasp the difference between that sequence of military moves and those to which they were a response, or between Kuwait
and Panama, or Kuwait and the Soviet attack on Finland in 1939. The
distinctions are normative and characterized as such by the various
participants involved.
Let me illustrate these remarks by reference to the comprehensive
conception of security. That an understanding of "security" should not be
limited to military security, but should also encompass non-military
threats to states and people, has become a commonplace of post-Cold
War diplomatic language. 51 This expansion of the operating concept of
"security" highlights the fact that explaining international action by
reference to "security needs" remains an empty phrase unless "security"
is first given a meaning. This involves an appreciation of what is signifi-

Orford, supra note 47, at 390 & n.7 1.
49. Richard Price, A Genealogy of the Chemical Weapons Taboo, 49 INT'L ORG. 73, 88

(1995).
50. See PETER WINCH,

THE IDEA OF SOCIAL SCIENCE AND ITS RELATION TO PHILOSOPHY

108-11 (1958), and more recently, with special reference to modern international theory,
NEUFELD, supra note 45, at 70-94.
51. See GARETH EVANS, COOPERATING FOR PEACE: THE GLOBAL AGENDA FOR THE 1990s
AND BEYOND 15-16 (1993); OUR GLOBAL NEIGHBORHOOD: THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION

ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 42, at 80-82; Barry Buzan, New Patterns of Global
Security in the Twenty-First Century, 67 INT'L AFF. 431, 439-51 (1991).
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cant to the identity of political communities called "states. 52 Again, an
answer to that question depends on whether we see a state's identity in
territorial, economic, institutional, ideological, gendered, religious, or
constitutional terms.53 Besides, the links between security and statehood
are increasingly questioned, and diplomatic rhetoric has resorted to notions
such as "common security," "comprehensive security," or even "human
security" to describe the objectives of international policy. A reference to
"security needs" as an explaining factor or an agreed principle of policy
encounters, on the Realist side, the same difficulties that, the attempt to
define "aggression" has always (and famously) met on the Idealist side:
the notions remain both overdetermining and underdetermining. On the
one hand, every event that modifies the state's external environment poses
a threat to the state, and may therefore be deemed to constitute "aggression" or "intervention." On the other hand, no event can permanently
remain within these categories since the principle of inclusion may always
be challenged by constructing the state's identity or its sphere of sovereignty in a novel fashion. The controversy is therefore normative - "what
is significant for the identity of this state or for the furtherance of this type
of policy?" - and not empirical. 4
The matrix that describes the international world in terms of statal
power policy has been challenged by interdependence theory and more
recent research into the roles of culture, class, gender, and tradition for
international affairs. 5 Nonetheless, as R.B.J. Walker notes, "a large
proportion of research in the field of international relations remains
content to draw attention to contemporary innovations while simply
taking a modernist framing of all spatiotemporal options as an unques-

52. See, e.g., J. Ann Tickner, Re-visioning Security, in INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
THEORY TODAY 175 (Ken Booth & Steven Smith eds., 1995); Ole Waever, Identity, Integration and Security: Solving the Sovereignty Puzzle in E. U. Studies, 48 J. INT'L Ars:. 389 (1995).
53. BARRY BUZAN, PEOPLE, STATES & FEAR 57-107 (2d ed. 1991).

54. The same point may be made by highlighting the degree to which the debate about the
United Nations' or individual states' competence to intervene in internal crises constantly redefines the basis of sovereign statehood. Whether we believe "sovereignty" to be located in the
"people," in the Head of State, or in the state's institutions will provide us with different, and
often contradictory, justifications for or against intervention. From this perspective, statehood
provides no limit for intervention. On the contrary, it is an effect of our assumptions about the
right form of government. See WEBER, supra note 38. The resuscitated "constitutivist" approach
to the recognition of states, which conditions statehood on domestic democracy and guarantees
for minority protection, works, of course, in the same direction. See European Community:
Declarationon Yugoslavia and on the Guidelines on the Recognition of New States, 31 I.L.M.
1485 (1992).
55. For a particularly strong anti-statal matrix using the "deep-structure" of the capitalist
world-system in which nationalism and universalism appear as historical or local instances, see
IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, GEOPOLITICS AND GEOCULTURE: ESSAYS ON THE CHANGING
WORLD-SYSTEM 139-237 (1991) (discussing the role of "culture" and "civilization" as the
"intellectual battlegrounds" of post-Cold War policy).
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tionable given. 56 This is partly a result of the fact that Realism encapsulates deeply entrenched commonsense assumptions. In part, it also follows
from a real difficulty to see how the "innovations" would inform political
practices. After all, as I have argued elsewhere, one can reimagine the
structures of the international world only now and then. For the rest of
the time we seem compelled to act within an actual political community. 7
For present purposes, it suffices to note that the need to choose the
matrix highlights the normative element hidden in Realist premises, an
element sometimes revealed in private positions Realists have taken on
moral or political issues.5 By failing to take its normative commitments
seriously (even at best marginalizing them into a problem of "ethics and
international relations"), Realism opens itself to a political criticism
which alleges that Realism lacks the instruments to defend itself. Moreover, lack of sensitivity for the non-descriptive undermines the
instrumentalism upon Realism bases its claim for superiority. The kind
of tragic heroism embedded in Realism's attempt to confront power and
vice directly, without the mediating vessels of ethics/ideology, is undermined by the equally ideological character of that posture itself; the
posture being equally a role within the drama of international diplomacy
that it pretends to "describe," a role that, however logically compatible
with fighting the noble fight (for a lost cause), too easily becomes a
justification for complacency.
B. The Engaged Perspective
For Realists, reference to norms, such as the obligation to participate
in common action under Articles 2(5) or 48 of the Charter, in an explanation of international politics appears as it appeared to the American
legal Realists of the 1930s; namely, as transcendental nonsense, an "attempt to exorcise social evils by the indefatigable repetition of magic
formulae."59 Obligations are both causally ineffectual and unamenable to
scientific inquiry. By contrast, the process whereby states apply power to
advance their interests seems more firmly linked with observable reality

56. R.B.J.

WALKER, INSIDE/OUTSIDE: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AS POLITICAL THEORY

7 (1993).
57. Martti Koskenniemi, Book Review, 89 AM. J.INT'L L. 227, 230 (1995) (reviewing
RECONCEIVING REALITY, supra note 47).
58. The two standard examples are Morgenthau's opposition to the Vietnam War and

Martin Wight's private pacifism. For a discussion, see Jim George, Realist "Ethics," International Relations, and Post-Modernism: Thinking Beyond the Egoism-Anarchy Thematic, 24
MILLENNIUM J. INT'L STUD. 195, 205-07 (1995).
59. Hans J.Morgenthau, Positivism, Functionalism, and International Law, 34 AM. J.
INT'L L. 260, 260 (1940).
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and may therefore appear amenable to causal hypotheses whose verity
can always be checked by experience. 60
That Realism is the genre of theory, and not engagement, is clear
from its emphasis on causality. The acting subject is the external observer, the policy-scientist, possibly employed by a government office to
"predict" the future course of international policy in order to formulate
scenarios for appropriate response. In the previous section, I argued that
Realism's causal models were dependent on, or could not be applied in
abstraction from, normative choices regarding desirable courses of action.
Here I make the point that causal description fails to grasp the ("internal") perspective of diplomats or lawyers working within an institutional
environment such as the Security Council. For them, the argument that
the Council's policy is caused by interests well-represented in the Council is as relevant or interesting a point to make as the argument to
government officials that governments tend to propose legislation that
advances the interests represented by the governmental coalition. Such
statements, whatever their status otherwise, raise at least three points.
First, neither statement has a necessary bearing on whether the proposed
legislation or policy is justified. That the United Nations has dealt with
the humanitarian crisis in Bosnia in an insufficiently effective manner
because the resources, interests, or policies of the great powers have
militated against full-scale involvement may or may not be true. But its
truth or falsity is not a sufficient response to the question of whether the
United Nations has been justified in acting in the way it has, or what
might be the right course of action to proceed in the future.
Second, neither statement is helpful when it is precisely what those
interests are or what kind of action best serves them that needs examination. To some extent, at least, the United Nations' hesitation at the outset
of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia during 1991 reflects this problem.
Was it in the Western allies' interests to prevent or to facilitate dissolution? This is not only a technical question. Often interests cannot even be
identified without a prior political choice. Will participation in a
Common European Defense be in the interests of traditional military
neutrals such as Austria, Finland, or Ireland? An answer to this question
depends on an earlier choice regarding whether the "natural home" of
these countries is within or without a Western political community.
Third, and most fundamental, Realism's theoretical-empirical bias
compels it to treat justification as a process of "fagade legitimation," the
dressing of the technically necessary policy in the garb of generally
acceptable norms. This leads Realism into supporting manipulative

60. Id. at 260-84; see also J.S. Watson, A Realistic Jurisprudenceof InternationalLaw,
1980 Y.B. WORLD AFF. 265, 266-67, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL LAW 3, 4-5 (Martti
Koskenniemi ed., 1992).
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diplomatic practices, approaches to negotiation that presume the primacy
of the hegemonic powers. This is not simply ethically questionable, but
also bad policy. For, inasmuch as "interests" or "security" are not facts
of nature but social constructions, the effects of language and political
preference, they cannot be distinguished from the justifications that seek
to realize them. Whether or not dealing with an internal humanitarian
crisis (such as Liberia in 1992 or Rwanda in 1994) should be seen as a
matter of collective security, and thus the object of concerted action,
cannot be adequately discussed by invoking a presumed causal chain
from the crisis to the. security of other states (through the resulting refugee problem, for instance), but involves a prior redefinition of the
community itself - who are "we" as subjects of security?
In order to grasp the "internal" or engaged perspective on collective
security, let me discuss the Security Council's reaction to the Iraqi attack
on Kuwait in the fall of 1990 in the light of personal recollections of the
role that legal argument seemed to play in the process.
During 1989-90, Finland was one of the elected members of the
Security Council. I was posted at the Finnish Permanent Mission in New
York at the time and assigned to serve as legal advisor to the Finnish
Council team. The nine-member team was headed by the Permanent
Representative who was not only Ambassador and Under-Secretary of
State, but also a former professor of Political Science in Finland. Most of
the team came from the political department of the foreign service. My
position in the delegation was relatively humble, somewhere around the
middle of the list. This corresponded closely to the place of my opposite
numbers, the lawyers in the other fourteen delegations. We were neither
among the leading policy-makers nor among the youngest rapporteurs.
I had no formal instructions to obey as the lawyer of the team. Of
course, there were general guidelines applicable to all the members
regarding the direction of Finnish United Nations policy, plus some more
specific instructions in particular crises. But while it seemed evident to
everyone that there had to be one lawyer (indeed, one was certainly
enough) among the nine, there was no articulated explanation for this
certainty. The same applied, I believe, to my colleagues, at least in the
WEOG ("Western European and Others' Group") delegations. None of
us had any specific "legal" instructions. The place of law in the Security
Council was in this respect obscure. It was perhaps assumed that since
we had done quite a bit of international law previously, we would know
what to do at the right moments. Our role arose from a shared professional background, not from conscious planning.
Much of the lawyer's work was identical with that of others: sitting
at informal and formal meetings, participating in recurring consultations
headed by the month's president, and reporting home on a daily basis.
The lawyer concentrated on textual aspects of resolutions, on those
aspects of particular crises that involved legal status (such as the situation
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in the Palestinian occupied territories) and on the negotiation of generally
formulated, "legislative" resolutions (such as a resolution on plastic
explosives and on terrorism 61). From a policy perspective, these issues
were neither quite central, nor fully marginal: my diplomatic placing
corresponded to the level of my tasks.
In, routine matters, the law's (lawyer's) role in the Council during
1989-90 arose from two informal considerations embedded in the
working culture of the Council. First, the jurist was expected to assess
the domestic and constitutional implications of particular resolutions.
Second, particular geographically limited disputes that had been on the
Council's agenda for a long time were allocated to political officials
experts on the region ,or on the dispute itself. Contrary to received
wisdom, law's role seemed the most limited in routine issues on which
everyone had fixed positions and no dramatic moves were or could
reasonably be expected. Where the political framework was stable, the
lawyer was the handmaid of the politician, helping out if new language
for negotiation and consensus was needed. That role depended on pragmatic considerations, not on any shared or articulated theory regarding
the delimitation of legal and political matters.
However, things looked different when a non-routine issue emerged.
On the night of August 2, 1990, Iraqi troops invaded Kuwait. I was on
holiday in Finland on that day but returned to New York very soon
thereafter. By the time of my return, the Council had demanded immediate withdrawal of Iraqi troops, established the obligation of non-recognition on member states, and implemented the first full-scale economic
embargo on any state since the League of Nations' action against Italy in
1935-36.62
I have been trained as a Finnish career diplomat in the belief that in
matters concerning the existence of states - such as the Kuwait crisis Finland's vital interests, as determined by the political leadership, become the basis for our diplomatic action. Trained in the spirit of post-war
Realism, I had little difficulty accepting that legal norms should in such
cases defer to political requirements. Indeed, Finland's own experience
with the League in 1939 seemed the best argument for this necessity.
As I returned to New York in the middle of August 1990, however,
I was struck by the enthusiasm with which my "political" colleagues in
the delegation had immersed themselves in a controversy about the legal
status of the various courses of action taken by or available to the
Council and to my own delegation. How should sanctions be. administered? What about the blocking of Iraq's ports? What was the status of
61. S.C. Res. 638, U.N. SCOR, 44th Sess., 2872d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/638 (1989);
S.C. Res. 635, U.N. SCOR, 44th Sess., 2869th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/635 (1989).

62. S.C. Res. 661, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2933d mtg., U.N. Doc. SIRES/661 (1990);
S.C. Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2932d mtg., U.N. Doc. SIRES/660 (1990).
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Western troop concentrations in Saudi Arabia? What law applied to the
Embassies in Kuwait City or in Baghdad? The delegation, as well as
Helsinki, clearly believed that legal viewpoints were not only somewhat
relevant, but in some respects central to devising a national position.
The headquarters acted in a similar way. I found permanent representatives and political colleagues grouping in the corridors with the little
blue book - the U.N. Charter - in their hands, quarreling about the
meaning of the various parts of Chapter VII of the Charter, giving
contrasting interpretations about the extent of the right of self-defense
under Article 51, and disagreeing about whether Article 42 (military
sanctions) needed to be applied in conjunction with Articles 43 and 47
on the provision of national contingents and the role of the military staff
committee respectively. Even Prime Minister Thatcher at one point took
pains to argue that the concentration of coalition troops in Saudi Arabia
before the Council had authorized the use of military force had been a
perfectly legitimate application of the right of collective self-defense
under Article 51.
How should we understand the fact that in the midst of one of the
most serious cases of aggression in the post-war order, diplomats at the
United Nations started invoking legal norms and arguing as if whatever
action the United Nations or its member states could take was dependent
on rules of law? A first point to make is that I do not think anyone saw
the Council's role akin to a penal court, acting in Montesquieu's image
as "la bouche qui prononce les paroles de la loi." Though necessary,
nobody thought it sufficient to establish what the law said. Of course,
this would also have been bad law. The Council is not a court. It is not
obliged to react in any predetermined way to any "breach of the peace,
threat to the peace or act of aggression." Nor do these concepts spell out
an "international crime" akin to "theft" under national law that would
require the Council to order a "sanction."63 The Council may react even
in the absence of unlawfulness; and a violation of the law does not by
itself trigger Council competence. Besides, as every national judge
knows, Montesquieu's image is pure fiction. There is always choice and
policy involved in law application, the relevant norms being open-textured and open to exceptions. This was a fact that was easy to agree
upon in the Council.
A second possibility is to think that the delegations agonized over
international law in the fall of 1990 not because they felt they had to
find the "one right answer," but because they needed to determine what
limits were imposed by the law upon Council "discretion." This would

63. For the juristic discussion about the nature of Chapter VII "sanctions" as police
measures, see, e.g., HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
OF ITS FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS 732-37 (1951).
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be a liberal and a realistic response, imagining Charter provisions as a
neutral framework leaving ample room for political maneuver. But this
is not really psychologically plausible. "Law" and "discretion" did not
exist in separate pigeon-holes in our minds. The legal debate did not
"stop" at any point to leave room for a separate political choice; political
choices were posed the moment the legal debate started.
A better metaphor than pigeon-holing for the law/politics relationship
might refer to the contemplation of a landscape. In the morning, we see
the colors of the trees and the reflection of the leaves on the water; in the
evening, we notice the outline of the cliffs against the grey sky, and the
shadow of the forest stretches far into the sea. The landscape is the same,
the messages it conveys are different. The images are equally self-contained and full. We can reproduce both separately, but we cannot mix
them. Likewise, law and politics seemed coherent and separate, yet
related to one single reality.
And yet reality has a temporal dimension: morning turns into day
and the evening begins sooner than we had noticed. In the Security
Council, law and politics developed analogously into each other. As the
debate progressed each successive moment added something to our
understanding, until the original image had turned into its counterpart.
We saw the landscape first in the brightness of legal language: aggression, sanctions, blockade, non-recognition. This language was used to
give expression to the contrasting positions of the delegations. These
were positions of the evening, visible only in an obscure, shadowy form,
impossible to reach in description. The further the debate progressed, the
clearer became the interdependence of light and shadow, law and politics,
and the focus was increasingly on the boundary. The amount of time
available determined the point at which debate had to finish and action
had to be taken. Thereafter, that action, and its justifications, turned into
precedent, calling for formal consistency in future behavior. Legal and
political simultaneously, the long line of resolutions in the fall of 1990
sought to give effect to the ambitions of their drafters as well as to the
Charter. In retrospect, we interpret them from both perspectives, yet we
can do this fully only from one perspective at a time, by keeping the
other outside our gaze.
There is, of course, a third possible understanding about the sense of
these debates; namely, that they served only to camouflage the play of
ideologies, power, and interests that were "really determining" behind a
legalisticfafade. What may appear as the brightest day is in truth the
darkest night! There are two versions of this understanding. First, it may
be assumed that part of diplomatic training is to learn to lie about one's
true aims. Under this version, the debate in New York was a fraud. It is
difficult to prove or disprove this suggestion which speaks about the real,
though hidden, intentions of diplomats at the United Nations. Although
I have to make allowance for the odd exception, I find this psychologi-
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cally implausible. Most of the diplomats "honestly" felt that arguments
about the Council's competence to order a blockade of Iraq's ports,.for
instance, 64 had intrinsic relevance. In any case, this criticism misses the
point. These are arguments whose validity in no way presupposes honesty in making them. The legality of the blockade has nothing to do with
the state of mind of the person invoking it. A day is a day if it looks like
one. There is no deeper reality that might prove it otherwise; even our
watches provide only a conventional temporal interpretation.
The same is true of the second version which provides that, notwithstanding the states of mind of delegation members, the legal debate was
intrinsically without a consequence. Under this view, the diplomats were
acting under a false consciousness, a legalistic ideology which camouflaged the fact that what was going on was use of power to further
national interests. This kind of "Realism" is very common and presents
an extremely critical picture about the United Nations assuming that
diplomats do not really understand their job but act under a legalistic
spell. I find it hard to support this understanding on an intuitive basis.
The Finnish delegation, for instance, was en bloc trained as hard-headed
Realists. If there had been indoctrination, it was surely not of the legalist
sort. The architect of post-war Finnish foreign policy, President Paasikivi,
once remarked famously that the Kremlin is no Court of Law, meaning
(among other things) that sound legal arguments are a poor substitute for
clever policy when it comes to Finland's relations with its Eastern
neighbor. Though the historic background is of course different, I believe
that this applied to the non-lawyers in the other delegations as well.
More important, however, is that this criticism presents an exclusively external perspective on the events. Legal arguments camouflage
the determining force of political or economic power. That is their very
point. In the morning we see light. But we. know it is inevitable that
darkness will fall, and we can examine it later, but not at the same time.
However determining political power may be, it is irrelevant for delegations struggling to find public justification for Council action. It may be
true that "international government is, in effect, government by that state
which supplies the power necessary for the purpose of governing." 6 But
such a causal assumption provides nothing to those examining the
justifiability of proposed courses of action within an institutional structure.
This is my point about the role of law in the Kuwait crisis. In 1990,
the traditional patterns of Council decisionmaking had become irrelevant

64. For the Council's actions regarding the blockade, see S.C. Res. 665, U.N. SCOR, 44th
Sess., 2938th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/665 (1990).
65. EDWARD H. CARR, THE TWENTY YEARS' CRISIS 1919-1939: AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 107 (Harper & Row 1964) (1939).
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and inapplicable. There was no anterior political agreement, no longstanding negotiation with fixed positions, and no routine language to
cover the events. The situation was canvassed nowhere but in the Charter
itself. As the debate took on a legal style and an engaged aspect, the rest
of formalism followed suit: the search for precedent (Southern Rhodesia
for the management of economic sanctions) and consistency (in the
formulation of the resolutions during the autumn of 1990), the concern
for human rights, diplomatic inviolability, and humanitarian law were all
strikingly central to the resolutions. Placing the argument in the context
of law, there seemed to be no halfway house. The Council could not just
apply some law in the Kuwait crisis, leaving the rest unapplied. Long
shadows would have been inconsistent with the place of the sun in our
landscape. After all, this was the same time as the signing of the "Charter of Paris" by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE) which stressed the need for the rule of law in the management
of political societies.
It is an uninteresting truism that delegations couch decisions in legal
garb to make them look more respectable. That is the point of law.
Clearly both the United States and the Yemeni delegations, like those of
Finland, Canada, and Romania, sought interpretations that would be in
line with their (partly differing) policies. No delegation wishes to report
to its capital that it cannot pursue the instructed policy because it cannot
defend it in legal terms. Those terms will be found. But though this may
appear to support the Realist critique about "fagade legitimation," it fails
to appreciate how legitimation or justification always has a "fagade"
aspect to it without this making it any less necessary. Justification is only
more complex, tentative, and fragile than the Realist straw-man image of
"rule application" would suggest. Newton may have come up with the
theory of gravity by sitting under an apple tree and being struck by a
falling apple. This causal account of the events, however accurate, is no
explanation of his genius nor even a beginning of a theory of gravitation
defensible in the scientific community. Newton's genius was in the act of
justifying his intuition to his fellow scientists in the form of a coherent
theory in accordance with the rules of scientific discourse, not in the
process which causally produced it.
The engaged perspective that looks for justification differs from the
construction of theories about determining causes by assuming the
existence of and invoking an inter-individual, international, political
community in which the speaker is situated. Saying that "I believe this
is aggression because it suits me to think so" emerges from a solipsism
in which others exist only as objects of want-satisfaction. By contrast,
saying that this is "aggression" under Article 39 of the Charter invokes
a 1945 agreement and a polity in which the speaker situates herself and
every person to whom the statement is directed. The road to an undistorted communal life is of course not thereby created. Much more would
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be needed for that purpose. Without justifying discourse, however, social
life would be reduced to manipulative relationships: security will be the
security of the king while no problem will seem too small for the intervention of the security force!
Law's contribution to security is not in the substantive responses it
gives, but in the process of justification that it imports into institutional
policy and in its assumption of responsibility for the policies chosen.
Entering the legal culture compels a move away from one's idiosyncratic
interests and preferences by insisting on their justification in terms of the
historical practices and proclaimed standards of the community. Even if
it does not, as both Formalists and Realists may have thought, lift the
burden of substantive choice, it implies a recognition of the existence of
a world beyond the speaker's immediate subjectivity. Only in this way
can "security" maintain its beneficial, altruistic orientation, instead of
invoking the somber association with the security police - arrests after
midnight, featureless officials, and insulated cellars. As opposed to
technical-instrumental rationality, a legal culture involves a "situational
ethics,"66 encompassing not only rules and principles (after all Realists
were right in stressing their indeterminacy) but a fairness of process, an
attitude of openness, and a spirit of responsibility that implicitly or
expressly means submission to critique and dialogue with others about
the proper understanding of the community's principles and purposes
in a word, its identity.67 Law is what lawyers do, said Max Weber in one
of the most adept definitions of it. He was of course thinking about
national societies with a high degree of professional specialization. In the
international context, law is what diplomats do when they debate the
meaning of the U.N. Charter, the competence of the Security Council, or
Libya's duties under particular Council resolutions. There is nothing
substantive that would distinguish those debates from political Diktat. An
enlightened despot or a monkey might sometimes succeed in reciting the
right Charter article. What makes these debates legal is the manner in
which they are conducted: by open reference to rules and principles
instead of in secret and without adequate documentation; by aiming
toward coherence and consistency, instead of a selective bargaining
between "old boys"; by an openness to revision in light of new information and accountability for choices made, instead of counting on getting
away with it.

66. Robert H. Jackson, The Political Theory of InternationalSociety, in INTERNATIONAL

124-27.
67. For a useful redefinition of Weber's "ethics of responsibility" so as to involve a
dialogical relationship between the responsible agent and the person to whom the agent is
responsible, see DANIEL WARNER, AN ETHIC OF RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 104-16 (1991).
RELATIONS THEORY TODAY, supra note 52, at 110,
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Realism's theoretical-empirical bias would not be too serious if
Realism remained content with its status as expert knowledge. But it
does not. Realists stress the practical character of their information, its
role in the formation of policy and statecraft. Thereby Realism itself becomes a sociological problem. Even as it readily concedes the (theoretical) separation of "is" and "ought" as a matter of practical consequences,
it answers the latter by reference to the former. It thinks about peace,
security, and social order in terms of "jobs" to be carried out, or a series
of "problems" to be resolved. It hopes to do this by employing resources
in accordance with advice from technical, intelligence, and military
experts whose expertise is limited to the narrowest possible range of
relevant "issues": nuclear deterrence, arms control, peacekeeping, diplomacy. The tricky and eminently political question of the meaning of
"peace" in particular circumstances, indeed, the delimitation of the
circumstance itself, is never raised and cannot be raisedwithout immediately posing the question of the qualifications of the experts charged to
deal with it. Was the "issue" in the Gulf War the old boundary disagreement between Iraq and Kuwait? The internal regime of these countries?
Peace in the Middle East? Or was the "issue" access to strategic resources? It was treated as an "aggression" of one United Nations member
state against another because that is the language of the Security Council,
but it was managed through a military operation because "hard" issues of
sovereignty are deemed to fall ultimately under the soldiers' realm of
competence. In contrast, genocide in Rwanda would trigger principally
the competence of relief workers and refugee organizations.
Difficulties in reaching political agreement at the global scale (which
is the United Nations' scale) on the right characterization of local political events (do they implicate "security?") and priorities for action has led
to an international culture of functional specialization and compartmentalization. This is nowhere more visible than in the separation of the
United Nations' hard core political activities from its economic and
social activities, with each body and each department in the Secretariat
jealously guarding its individual allotment of problems to solve. The
justification for a particular action is always given by the non-political,
technical competence of the body dealing with it. Indeed, it often seems
that the crucial decision about some particular policy is which organ or
department is empowered to deal with it (or succeeds in monopolizing
it). Once we know the organ or department, we already have a good idea
about what sort of action will be taken.
In contrast, a legal culture is never only about how to get there. It
also poses the question of what there is to get to. The lawyers' anxiety
about the proper legal basis of a Security Council resolution always
implicitly refers to the institutional teleology of the United Nations. It
has two aspects which a purely instrumental debate lacks. First, it implies
recognition of situatedness in a political community and openness to
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dialogue with other members of the community. To put one's argument
in terms of Articles 42, 43, and 47 of the Charter is to reaffirm the
institutional character of the problem, a readiness to bind oneself to a
policy vis-a-vis the others, and an assumption of the responsibility for so
doing. Second, it entails a redefinition of the community's (the United
Nations') constitutive principles and objectives. Legal argument is never
deduction from self-evident rules. It always adds to our understanding of
the law, and thus to the identity, objective, and principles of the community. The periodic fluctuations of the United Nations' image between
that of an economic and social development organization and that of the
guarantor of "peace and security" reflect a constant redefinition of the
organization's identity as a result of its institutional policies.
There is in fact not much difference between standard Realism and
its traditional rival, Institutionalism. Both are concerned about cause and
effect in a description of the international world juxtaposing uniform
agents (states) within a structure of international policy in which "power"
is deployed for the attainment of "interests" and in which the aggregate
result is characterized in terms of "peace/war." Where Realists assume
that the best causal model reproduces the structure of the balance of
power, and that any institutional policy must defer to this,
Institutionalists agree, but argue that the best way for the balance to
operate is to defer to institutions.68 Accordingly, any description of the
international world is capable of supporting both positions: the absence
of peace may always be explained either as the absence of the balance or
power, or as the absence of adequate institutions through which the
balance could realize itself!69
This indeterminacy of the Realist/Institutionalist debate is one result
of their theoretical-instrumental bias. The anterior choice of the determining structures in a causal description of the international world is left
unaddressed in both theories and the conclusions are hidden in their premises. Realist descriptions win if one already believes in the superiority
of an understanding of the world in terms of atomistic and egoistic states
obsessed by a power-maximizing urge. Institutionalist portrayals seem
more compelling if one sees the world in terms of an underlying structural causation that views states as instruments for an underlying histori-

68. Charles A. Kupchan & Clifford A. Kupchan, The Promise of Collective Security,
Summer 1995, at 52 (a response to the criticism by Mearsheimer, cited supra
note 5).
69. The same applies to international lawyers' standard response to the Realist challenge.
To argue that most states do follow most of the rules most of the time may seem to rescue
international law's "relevance" by showing the wide scope of application of its rules - but it
does this only at the cost of their normative nature. The result is a description of international
reality that underwrites both politics and law - obscuring the normative aspects of both in the
process. MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT 143-53 (1989).
INT'L SECURITY,
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cal, economic, or military logic. To repeat: any fact situation can always
be described in terms of either matrix while the choice of the matrix indeed, the question whether the choice is more apparent than real seldom enters the picture.
V. THE WORK OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

The European Congress system that was set up after the Napoleonic
wars during 1814-15 is usually regarded as the first attempt at collective
security. It was based on a statist ideology that held all threats against
the status quo as security threats to be counteracted as necessary by
collective force. Even Castlereagh was able to defend Austrian intervention against the revolution in Naples in 1820, which evoked much sympathy in Britain, by reference to Austrian security interests that had been
sanctioned by the Alliance. The main interest was an undefined "security" to which other normative concerns had to defer. The fundamental
problem of that system was clearly explained in an early British memorandum:
The idea of an "Alliance Solidaire," by which each State shall be
bound to support ...

all other States from violence and attack,

upon condition of receiving for itself a similar guarantee, must be
understood as morally implying the previous establishment of such
a system of general government as may secure and enforce upon all
kings and nations an internal system of peace and justice. Till the
mode of constructing such a system shall be devised the consequence is inadmissible, as nothing would be more immoral or more
prejudicial to the character of government generally than the idea
that their force was collectively to be prostituted to the support of
established power without any consideration of the extent to which
it was abused.70
During the Cold War, issues of legitimacy and justifiability such as those
raised in this memorandum could not arise as it was clear that there was
no such "system of general government" to which they could be dealt
with by reference. Now, however, the situation may have changed. The
vocabulary of the CSCE Paris Charter of 199071 or of the Security
Council summit declaration of 1992 suggests that at least governmental
rhetoric has moved to a level that has prompted observers to speak about

70. THE CONCERT OF EUROPE 42 (Rend Albrecht-Carrid ed., 1968) (quoting a memoran-

dum on the Treaties of 1814 and 1815, submitted by the British Plenipotentiaries at the
Conference of Aix-la-Chapelle, October 1818).
71. Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Charter of Parisfor a New
Europe, 30 I.L.M. 190, 193-208 (1991).
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an "emerging right to democratic governance. '72 It may appear that the
Security Council is now in a position to enforce the public morals of a
new order.
Many of the Council's recent actions have been seen in this light,
especially its readiness to intervene in civil wars73 and its increasing
resort to statements about the illegality of particular forms of state behavior. 4 Closely related are the Council's decisions to set up two war crimes
tribunals 75 and a war reparations procedure, 76 as well as the authorization

to use force to apprehend criminals. 77 The Council has demarcated and

guaranteed boundaries,78 enforced its own decisions by recourse to
economic sanctions, 79 and authorized the use of force to ensure the
departure of a military regime. 80 All of this seems justified through a
redefinition of "security" by reference to a background conception of an
international law, or of a public morality that has become the Council's
business to enforce.
The most remarkable action in this respect has been, of course, the
Council's much belabored economic boycott to force Libya to extradite

72. Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L

L. 46 (1992).
73. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 929, supra note 14, at pmbl. para. 10 ("[dletermining that the
magnitude of the humanitarian crisis in Rwanda constitutes a threat to peace and security in
the region"); S.C. Res. 794, supra note 14, at pmbl. para. 3 ("[d]etermining that the magnitude
of the human tragedy caused by the conflict in Somalia, further exacerbated by the obstacles
being created to the distribution of humanitarian assistance, constitutes a threat to international
peace and security"); S.C. Res. 788, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3138th mtg. at pmbl. para. 5,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/788 (1992) ("[d]etermining that the deterioration of the situation in Liberia
constitutes a threat to international peace and security").
74. On the illegality of forcible territorial acquisitions and on the violation of the 1949
Geneva Conventions, see, e.g., S.C. Res. 836, supra note 14; S.C. Res. 780, U.N. SCOR, 47th
Sess., 3119th mtg., U.N. Doc. SIRES780 (1992); see also S.C. Res. 941, U.N. SCOR, 49th
Sess., 3428th mtg., U.N. Doc. SIRES/941 (1994) (all declarations concerning property made
under duress are void). For an extensive overview of the Council's practice in condemning
violations of international humanitarian law, see SIDNEY D. BAILEY, THE UN SECURITY
COUNCIL AND HUMAN RIGHTs 59-89 (1994); cf. supra note 21.

75. S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994);
S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993). It is
particularly noteworthy that these resolutions also contain the statutes of the two tribunals (on
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda) that define what law should be applied - a real legislative
power.
76. S.C. Res. 692, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2987th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/692
(1991); S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2981st mtg. at 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991);
S.C. Res. 674, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 295 1st mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/674 (1990).
77. S.C. Res. 837, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3229th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/837
(1993); see also S.C. Res. 978, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 3504th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc.
SIRES/978 (1995) (call for all states to apprehend suspects accused of participating in the
Rwandan massacres).
78. S.C. Res. 833, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3224th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/833 (1993).
79. S.C. Res. 687, supra note 76.
80. S.C. Res. 940, supra note 14.
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two Libyan citizens suspected of the terrorist attacks on the Pan Am
flight over Lockerbie in December 1988 and the French UTA flight over
Niger in September 1989.8' The Council defined Libya's refusal to
extradite the two men "as a threat to international peace and security." 2
There was no threat or use of force by Libya against any state. Libya's
policy was simply too unacceptable, and therefore definable as a security
threat, a position that overruled the provisions of an international convention in force between all the parties that would have allowed Libya to
refuse extradition.83
For the Realists, these developments are just more power policy in
disguise. Because the world remains as it was in Castlereagh's day, it
would be illusory to think that the Council is acting to enforce some new
code of morals or law. But, as I argued in the foregoing section, this is
certainly not so from an engaged perspective. Whatever the Council does
appears as an institutional activity and calls for an institutional justification. However, as recent debates on the concept of "threat to international
peace and security" (and hence of the Council's competence) have
shown, how such justification should be construed is by no means clear.
Lawyers have sought normative limits to Council authority from an
interpretation of Articles 1, 2, 24(1), and 39 of the Charter, laying down
the purposes and principles of the organization and the formal competence of the Council to try to create a link between them.84 But the
principles and purposes of the Charter are many, ambiguous, and conflicting. In particular, they are no less indeterminate than the original
concept of "threat to the peace" that they pretend to clarify. If the
Security Council takes action, does that not, byfiat, suffice to determine
the issue? What more is there to say? For this reason, some have em-

81. See S.C. Res. 731, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3033d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RESnl31 (1992).
82. S.C. Res. 748, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3063d mtg. at pmbl. para. 7, U.N. Doc.

S/RESf748 (1992).
83. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising
from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.), 1992 I.C.J. 114, 126-27 (Apr. 14)
[hereinafter Lockerbie Case]. For background and comment, see Fiona Beveridge, The
Lockerbie Affair, 41 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 907, 907-09 (1992).
84. Lockerbie Case, 1992 I.C.J. at 155-56 (Judge Bedjaoui, dissenting); id. at 170-75
(Judge Weeramantry, dissenting). Of the large commentary on the Lockerbie case, see, e.g.,
Jean Chappez, Questions d'interpritationet d'applicationde la Convention de Montrial de
1971 rdsultant de l'incident airien de Lockerbie, 1992 ANNUAIRE FRAN AIS DE DROIT

INTERNATIONAL [A.F.D.I.] (Centre National de laRecherche Scientifique) 468, 477-79;
Bernhard Graefrath, Leave to the Court What Belongs to the Court: The Libyan Case, 4 EUR.
J.INT'L L. 184, 186-87 (1993); see generally OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE 399-400 (1991); HAGUE ACAD. INT'L L., THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
ROLE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL: PEACE-KEEPING AND PEACE-BUILDING (Rend-Jean Dupuy

ed., 1992).
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braced the Kelsenian point that "[i]t is completely within the discretion
of the Security Council to decide what constitutes a 'threat to the
peace.' ,85 However, others have pointed out in impeccable legal logic
that "the United Nations is the creature of a treaty and, as such, it
exercises authority legitimately only in so far as it deploys powers which
the treaty parties have assigned to it." 6
In this controversy, law and politics keep deferring to each other in
an endless search for authority and normative closure: texts constrain
(law) - but need to be interpreted (politics); interpretative principles
need to be applied (law) - but they are conflicting and ambiguous
(politics); the International Court of Justice could perhaps decide the
matter (law) - but the Court has no jurisdiction in "political" matters
(politics); but is not the possibility for such judicial control implied in
the Charter (law) - well, that depends on how it is interpreted, and so
87
on.
Yet the question about the justifiability of Council action under
Chapter VII does not really pose itself in the abstract tone of whether or
not the Council is "bound" by legal principles. It is much more concretely linked to the Council's handling of particular problems. If there
is a problem about the legitimacy of Council action, as many argue,8 8 it

85. KELSEN, supra note 63, at 727; see also MICHAEL AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 219 (6th ed. 1992) ("[A] threat to the peace is whatever the

Security Council says is a threat to the peace.").
86. Thomas M. Franck, The Security Council and 'Threats to the Peace': Some Remarks
of Remarkable Recent Developments, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ROLE OF THE SECURITY
COUNCIL: PEACE-KEEPING AND PEACE-BUILDING, supra note 84, at 83.

87. It is interesting how all the parties in the Lockerbie Case subscribed both to the view
that law and politics were part of the same hierarchical structure as well as to their being
hermetically isolated from each other. Libya claimed that the Council's resolutions "infringe
... the enjoyment and the exercise of the rights conferred on Libyal,]" Lockerbie Case, 1992
I.C.J. at 125, and that there is "no competition or hierarchy between the Court and the Security
Council, each exercising its own competence[,]" id. at 126. The former argument assumes that
law and politics are part of the same structure, and that law (namely the law of the Montreal
Convention) predominates - the second argument assumes that law and politics are separate,
and that the Court should only be concerned with the former. The United States claimed that
protecting Libya's rights "would run a serious risk of conflicting with the work of the Security
Council[,]" id., and that "Libya has a Charter-based duty to accept and carry out the decisions
in the resolution," id. The former argument assumes again that law and politics are separate
and that it is precisely because they are separate that they may conflict - and it is the Court's
business to avoid such conflict. The latter argument links both into a hierarchical structure
where law predominates - this time the law of the Charter (instead of that of the Montreal
Convention). Neither party answers its opponent directly: If law should prevail, should it be
the law of the Charter or that of the Montreal Convention? If law and politics are distinct, does
this mean that the Court should ignore the possibility of conflict or prevent it?
88. See, e.g., Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa
in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, 1971 I.C.J.
16, 293-94 (June 21) (Judge Fitzmaurice, dissenting); David D. Caron, The Legitimacy of the
Collective Authority of the Security Council, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 552 (1993).
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is precisely in its practical approach to its task. There are at least five
broad groups of problems in this respect.8 9
The first problem is secrecy. Since the late 1980s the Council's
practice of holding informal consultations has expanded rapidly. 90 Today,
practically all the Council's substantive discussions take place outside the
official meetings. Council delegations meet at the horseshoe table in front
of the public only when substantive agreement has already been attained
or proved impossible. There is in general no access to the travaux
priparatoiresof particular resolutions.
Secrecy is, of course, a general problem of the political activities of
the United Nations. One example concerns the work of the Sanctions
Committees, established for the management of the sanctions regimes (at
the moment altogether six). 9' The Committees do not publish their
records or even their interpretative decisions. With the insignificant
exception of the Iraqi sanctions committee, and only with respect to the
Iraqi arms embargo, the Committees do not report to the Council. As a
result, there is no access for member states or the public to data that is
crucial for an evaluation of the success of the economic measures, with
the further implication that they will continue to be used as an article of
faith, not as a rational policy measure.'
A second problem concerns the' lack of procedural safeguards when
the Council is acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial role. For example, its
determination of Libya's guilt for complicity in the Lockerbie terrorist
attack and its liability in resolution 731 in January 1992 fell below all
standards of procedural fairness.93 Nor did the Council take into account
Iraq's claims when in 1993 it determined the place of the long-disputed
Iraq-Kuwait boundary. 94 And the basis on which the Iraqi Compensation
Commission distributes compensation is far from clear.95 In fact, the
Council has so far been unable to put its provisional rules of procedure
89. See also Koskenniemi, supra note 22, at 345-47.
90. See G.R. BERRIDGE, RETURN TO THE UN: UN DIPLOMACY IN REGIONAL CONFLICTS
3-11 (1991); cf. W. Michael Reisman, The ConstitutionalCrisis in the United Nations, 95 AM.
J. INT'L L. 83, 86 (1993).
91. For descriptive overviews, see Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the
Organization,U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., at 5, U.N. Doc. A/49/1 (1994); Nico Schrijver, The Use
of Economic Sanctions by the UN Security Council: An International Law Perspective, in
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT 123 (Harry H.G. Post ed., 1994).
92. For descriptions and criticisms, see Paul Conlon, Legal Problems at the Centre of
United Nations Sanctions, 64 NORDIC J. INT'L L. (forthcoming 1995); Martti Koskenniemi, Le
comiti des sanctions (criepar la rsolution 661 (1990) du Conseil de Sicuriti), 1991 A.F.D.I.
119; Michael P. Scharf & Joshua L. Dorosin, Interpreting UN Sanctions: The Rulings and Role
of the Yugoslavia Sanctions Committee, 19 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 771 (1993).
93. See Graefrath, supra note 84, at 187-91, 196, 204.
94. S.C. Res. 833, supra note 78.
95. See Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 19 of the Security
Council Resolution 687 (1991), U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., at 7, U.N. Doc. S/22559 (1991).
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into a definite form. However, since most of its activity takes place in
informal consultations, a mere formalization of its public procedures
would be of little avail. It has traditionally been argued that it is not the
Council's business to engage in the material settlement of disputes.
Practice has shown, however, that in cases where an argument can be
found based upon the Council's primary responsibility to uphold or
restore peace and security, even the imposition of a binding settlement
does not fall outside the Council's competence.
A third group of problems relates to the Council's lack of accountability both within the United Nations system and beyond. Much discussion has centered on the possibility of judicial control over the Council's
actions by the International Court of Justice. It may be more relevant for
the General Assembly to use its powers, for instance its budgetary
powers, to seek to influence or override the policy of the Council.96 In
addition, a revitalization of the "right of last resort" of member states
might be a non-negligible means to enhance the Council's accountability.97 However, none of these means answers the need to enhance the
Council's accountability to the groups of individuals and populations that
are affected by its actions.98 It is not easy to see how this might take
place, aside from increasing the transparency of the Council's activity.
The suggestion to reserve a right of participation in the Council's debates
for the representatives of local and other special interests would be a step
in a positive direction, although its impact would of course be much diminished by the practices of secrecy.
A fourth set of problems is related to the Council's lack of commitment to the policies it has chosen. The weakness of its reaction to the
crisis in the former Yugoslavia is a famous example. The practice of
authorizing member states to take military action on the Council's behalf
is another abdication of its responsibility; however, many delegations
explain it as a lack of resources on the United Nations' part. The same
explanation is given for the Council's lack of adequate political and
material support to the two war crimes tribunals. Much publicity has
concentrated on the situation of the Yugoslavian war crimes tribunal. The
Rwandan case seems even worse. By the end of August 1995, some
sixteen months after the genocide, the work of the war crimes tribunal
had not even commenced, while 51,000 prisoners were being held in

96. For a skeptical view in this respect, however, compare Francis Delon, L'Assemblie
giniralepeut-elle contrbler le Conseil de sdcuriti?, in LE CHAPITRE VII DE LA CHARTE DES
NATIONS UNIES, supra note 21, at 239.
97. See DAN CIOBANU, PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS RELATED TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE
UNITED NATIONS POLITICAL ORGANS 173-79 (1975) (discussing a state's right of last resort
under the laws of the United Nations).

98. See Orford, supra note 47.
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Rwandese prisons in facilities meant for 12,500. 99 A technical reason,
such as lack of resources, cannot function as a justification here. The
resources do exist in member states but are not allocated for a purpose
that might seem marginal or risky to potential contributors.
Finally, there is the much belabored question of the representativeness
of the Council as reflected in its composition. Most member states and
many observers view this as the Council's main problem, and suggest
amending the Charter so as to enhance its democratic legitimacy. Aside
from the diplomatic impossibility to agree on the amendment, I am
uncertain about the suggestion itself. As I have argued more fully elsewhere, the Council's role is to co-opt military power for the service of
the organization. Enhancing its democratic image supports even more
expanded powers for it, a consequence which I find objectionable.' °°
Inasmuch as it makes sense to speak of democracy in a statist international political system (which is by no means self-evidently beneficial
rhetorical strategy), it is surely the job of the General Assembly to
imagine the political community whose boundaries are then to be policed
by the Council. A number of suggestions to review the Council's working
patterns have been dealt with recently by United Nations bodies. The
Council itself initiated a number of minor, but still beneficial, amendments to its procedures.' 0 ' The Secretary-General has suggested reviewing
the practices that relate to the management of economic sanctions." ° In
1994, the General Assembly stressed the need to increase the transparency of the Council's activity and requested more detailed information
from the Council for this purpose. 01 3 A working group was set up to look
into the composition of the Council and its working practices. While the
democracy problem has, in the course of 1994 and 1995, proved as
intractable as in the past, without any agreement emerging on how the
Council's composition could be amended, a number of proposals have

99. Letter Dated 29 August 1995 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President
of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1995/762 (1995); see also Third
Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 955
(1994), U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1995f741 (1995).
100. Koskenniemi, supra note 22.
101. These include regular briefings by the president of the Council to the president of the

Assembly and the chairmen of regional groups, consultations with troop-contributing and other
"interested" countries, daily publication of the agendas of the Council's informal consultations,
monthly circulation among the permanent missions of its program of work, "orientation
debates" open to all members as the Council begins the consideration of new items, and the
reconsideration of the format of its reports to the Assembly. Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess.,

Agenda Item 33, U.N. Doc. A/49/965 (1995). Not all of these, however, have yet been
implemented.
102. Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position-Paper of the Secretary-General on the
66-76.
Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, supra note 15,
103. G.A. Res. 264, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., 102d plen. mtg., Agenda Item 53, U.N. Doc.

A/RFS/264 (1994).
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been presented to the working group on the secrecy issue. 1 The thrust
of the proposals is to increase the transparency of the Council's activity
with regard to non-members and especially "interested states." While
many proposals repeat the minor modifications already introduced by the
Council itself, other proposals underline the need to clarify the division
of competence among the Council and other United Nations bodies, to
review the practice of economic sanctions, and to update and make
permanent the Council's provisional rules of procedure.' ° The proposals
do not seek to modify the statist image of collective security, but they do
go some way toward strengthening legal culture within the Council.
VI. SECURITY AND LAW AS INSTITUTIONAL CULTURES

If there is any single point on which Realism agrees with Institutional
formalism, it is expressed in this one sentence by the most paradigmatic
of the formalists, Hans Kelsen: "By its very nature, collective security is
a legal principle, while the balance of power is a principle of political
convenience. ' 6 Realists embraced this definition and rejected collective
security precisely as the kind of legalistic Utopianism whose failure
seemed the single most important lesson from the League of Nations
experiment. De maximis non curat praetor. Today, most lawyers have
accepted that if law has a role to play in matters of security, it is as a
handmaid to state power and interest, a facilitator for politics to take its
natural course "by rationalizing and stabilizing the existing and improvised means of collaboration between [the] Powers."' 7 The favorite
metaphor invokes traffic regulation: the law's role is based on its usefulness for states in the same way as rules of the road are useful to motorists. "But it is precisely in the vital realm of power relations that it is at
its weakest."' '
The assumed primacy of policy over law implies both the existence
of fixed and verifiable state security interests and the presence of reliable
information on the causal chains that allow their realization. In this
image, shared by Realists and Institutionalists alike, law is purely external
and instrumental, something that decisionmakers choose to ignore or
apply at their will when seeking to fulfill interests and values. This is the
modem image of the "gardening state," the image of public policy in the

104. Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the
Security Council, supra note 101, Annex.
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service of human betterment.1°9 In this. image, international security
appears as a function of bureaucratic management skills in the combination of unilateral with institutional policies.
However, much of our late modern experience suggests skepticism
about the ability of public decision processes to reach their goals. In the
first place, there is uncertainty about those goals - whether their familiar
rhetorical forms actually encapsulate shared values or, interests. The
present consensus about a new "world order" is not immune from the
observation by E.H. Carr that "as soon as the attempt is made to apply
these supposedly abstract principles to a concrete political situation, they
are revealed as the transparent disguises of selfish vested interests.''1 °
Second, even if there were agreement -on such values or interests, we
seem to lack information about how they can be reached. Our science and
technology no longer seem reliable guides for action. Sometimes the solution of problems creates new, unforeseen, and often more serious problems, making the very process of policy as "problem-solution" inherently
suspect.
For such general reasons, there is room for skepticism about the
instrumental nature of law, its ability to express and to realize values,
interests, or indeed, "security.""' This skepticism is in no way diminished
by a reason specific to the law, such as the indeterminacy of its rules and
principles. Instead of being an external, objective instrument for policy,
law is enmeshed with the same uncertainties as policy - its application
remaining simultaneously a political act.
Realism and Institutionalism both imagine the law as an instrument
for political purposes. This, I argued earlier, is an offshoot of their
theoretical-empirical bias, that bias itself being inseparable from the modern image of the "gardening state" and supporting an international culture
of technical expertise in the manipulation of "power" for the enhancement
of "interests." I want to contrast that with my favorite quote from George
Kennan who once depicted international law as having "the unobtrusive,
almost feminine, function of the gentle civilizer of national self-interest[.] ' '" t2 Despite the intended irony, the quote reveals an important truth
about international law as a cultural instead of an instrumental phenomenon, highlighting the engaged aspect of the law, its being "inside" social
practices instead of "outside" them as an objective language or a formal
procedure. From that aspect, law acts as a spirit or an attitude that
involves recognizing the communal situatedness of the speaker: hence its
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111. For one useful discussion of the significance of such (and other) anti-instrumental
themes for legal practice, see Guyora Binder, Beyond Criticism, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 888 (1988).
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curious, yet typical, ability to engage the practitioner in political action
while seeking distance from anyone's idiosyncratic interests. Engaging in
the formalism of the legal argument inevitably makes public the normative basis and objectives of one's actions and assumes the actor's communal accountability for what it is that one is justifying. It is the antithesis
of a culture of secrecy, hegemony, dogmatism, and unaccountability.
For a brief moment in the autumn of 1990, the political context
within the Security Council seemed open and institutional culture might
have been revised. By early 1991, that momentum was gone. The Council
met only once during Operation Desert Storm, and even then in a closed
session. There is no longer much debate around the meaning of collective
self-defense, or the relationship among Articles 42, 43, and 47. The long
list of procedural problems, however, that remain under discussion in the
General Assembly as well as, to some extent, in the Council itself, remain
relevant for the development of a legal culture within the Council. Many
factors work against such development. The background of diplomats at
the United Nations who serve in the Council has traditionally focused on
the hard realities of power politics - one does not get into a Council
delegation by having served in development assistance! The routines and
composition of the political secretariat of the United Nations are equally
resistant to legal culture, as are its administrative inertia, lack of resources, recruitment policies, and the relative isolation of the office of legal
affairs from the political centre.
For me, it seems clear that law has a place in collective security as
a working culture of the "gentle civilizer" by opening conceptions and
practices of "security" to public debate, and by enhancing the accountability of governmental and international institutions for what goes on
under the label of "security policy." That security has expanded beyond
its military and statist component highlights its political and constructive
aspects and the inadequacy of the practices within the United Nations
(and elsewhere in international organizations) through which "security
matters" have been handled. Security can no longer be seen in terms of
expert knowledge managed through secret bureaucratic routines, but as
one theme among others that seeks to articulate the political values on
which we claim to base our communal identities.

